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█ Abstract In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in 
particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucial-
ly on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are 
many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot im-
agine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this claim in an attempt to show that Radden is 
mistaken. My argument relies on facts about individual differences involving imagination. To my mind, 
arguments like Radden’s involve an unfortunate slide from an “I can’t imagine…” claim to an “It can’t be 
imagined claim…” To support my argument, I also call upon empirical findings concerning pain imagina-
tion. As I conclude, we have no reason to think that the feeling of pain is something that is, in principle, 
unimaginable. 
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█ Riassunto La possibilità di immaginare il dolore – In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden in-
tende mostrare che le esperienze di dolore – e, in particolare, il dolore associato alla depressione – non 
possono essere semplicemente illusorie. Il cuore del suo argomento fa leva sull’affermazione per cui prova-
re dolore è immaginativamente al di là della nostra portata. Sebbene ritenga che si possano immaginare 
scenari nei quali proviamo dolore, Radden afferma che non si possa immaginare l’avvertire dolore di per 
sé. In questo commento mi concentrerò su questa affermazione nel tentative di mostrare che Radden si 
sbaglia. Il mio argomento poggia su fatti relativi alle differenze individuali che riguardano 
l’immaginazione. Dal mio punto di vista argomenti come quelli di Radden implicano un infelice slittamen-
to da una affermazione come “io non posso immaginare…” a una affermazione come “non si può immagi-
nare …”. A sostegno della mia tesi porterò evidenze empiriche relative all’immaginazione del dolore. Come 
giungerò a sostenere, non abbiamo ragioni per pensare che il provare dolore sia qualcosa in via di principio 
inimmaginabile. 
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IN IMAGINED AND DELUSIONAL PAIN Jennifer Rad-
den aims to show that experiences of pain – and in 
particular, the pain associated with depression – 
cannot be wholly delusional. When a depressed 
person reports feelings of pain, these reports can-
not be dismissed as a “mere figment” of that per-
son’s imagination. Radden’s sophisticated and in-
teresting argument involves many moving pieces, 
but at its center is a claim about the impossibility 
of imagining pain. On her view, though there are 
many ways that one can imagine scenarios involv-
ing oneself being in pain, one cannot imagine the 
feeling of pain itself. Drawing on the notion of 
formes frustes employed in medicine – a notion of 
“forms that are incomplete, although at first sight 
apparently possible, conditions” – Radden argues 
that imagining the feeling of pain is a forme fruste 
of imagining. It’s this claim on which I want to fo-
cus in this commentary. As I will argue, Radden is 
mistaken to think that the feeling of pain is imagi-
natively beyond our reach. 
 
█  1 Some preliminaries 
 
Radden takes as her opponent someone who claims 
that the depressed person’s pain is a delusion, i.e., 
that it is merely imaginary. Just to have a way of 
talking about this opponent, let’s call them the 
skeptic. Though Radden will grant to the skeptic 
that a depressed person may have various delusion-
al beliefs or other representations about their pain, 
perhaps about its cause or source, she denies that 
the affective state itself can be a delusion. To put 
this in her language, a depressed person may have 
affective delusions (delusions about affective states) 
but they cannot have delusional affections (affective 
states that are themselves delusions). 
To my mind, her argument against the skeptic 
might be best construed in terms of a dilemma. 
Consider a case in which the skeptic would grant 
that someone is genuinely in a painful state P1, 
i.e., that the state is not merely imaginary. P1 has a 
particular qualitative feel. Now compare the case 
that the skeptic wants to dismiss as merely imagi-
nary pain, i.e., as a case where the subject is not 
“genuinely” in painful state P1 but instead is imag-
ining being in P1. And then here’s the dilemma 
that I take Radden to have constructed. In imagin-
ing being in P1, either we somehow bring our-
selves to be in a state with the same qualitative feel 
as P1, or we don’t. If we do, then what we’re doing 
doesn’t really give us the kind of case that the op-
ponent needs. If we’re in a state that that has the 
same qualitative feel as P1, then we’re in P1, i.e., 
it’s a case where we’re experiencing (or re-
experiencing) P1. And if we’re experiencing P1, 
then even if the pain is in some sense imaginary, it 
is not merely imaginary. One is actually having a 
painful experience. On the other hand, if we don’t 
bring ourselves to be in a state with the same qual-
itative feel as P1, then here again we don’t get the 
kind of case the opponent needs. Though we’re 
now engaged in mere imagining, we haven’t suc-
ceeded in imagining P1, we’re not in a state with 
that qualitative feel, so we don’t have a case in 
which the painful state is merely imaginary be-
cause we don’t have a case of the painful state at 
all. In short, the skeptic’s argument fails on either 
horn of the dilemma – on the one, because the 
pain, while imagined, is not merely imagined; on 
the other, because the pain is not imagined at all. 
While I think there are some really interesting 
questions about the difference between some-
thing’s being imagined and its being merely imag-
ined, I won’t pursue those here.
1
 In what follows I 
will have nothing to say about Radden’s discussion 
of the first horn of the dilemma. Rather, my inter-
est relates to some of the issues that come up in 
the course of Radden’s discussion related to the 
second horn. In particular, I am interested in two 
related questions: first, what counts as imagining 
P1, and second, is this something that can be 
done? My aim is to offer some reasons for think-
ing that we should reject Radden’s answers to both 
these questions. In doing so, however, I don’t 
mean to be taking a position on the main issue 
that motivates her, i.e., whether a depressed per-
son’s pain can ever be treated as a delusional affec-
tion. I see myself as a different kind of opponent 
from the skeptic. It might well be that, even if my 
criticisms of Radden succeed, her answer to the 
skeptic still stands. Sorting that out would require 
that one think in more detail about several issues, 
perhaps most obviously, about the nature of delu-
sions and how they can best be understood and 
accounted for. As is perhaps already clear, my own 
interests in Radden’s discussion do not really con-
cern what’s going on with the depressed person 
per se (or how to characterize it) but rather what’s 
going on with someone who is engaged in an act of 
imagining a painful state. 
 
█  2 Imagining pain 
 
As a general matter, imagining a particular 
state of affairs can take many different forms, and 
matters are no different when it comes to imagin-
ing a pain state such as P1. To home in on the 
kind of imagining she’s interested in, Radden first 
distinguishes several different kinds of imaginings 
in the vicinity. For example, consider the distinc-
tion often drawn in discussions of imagining expe-
riences between imagining an experience from the 
outside and imagining that experience from the in-
side. When one imagines oneself being in a pain 
state such as P1 from the outside, one might imag-
ine the way that one looks when in P1 – one visu-
alizes oneself with a grimaced expression on one’s 
face, doubled over, clenching one’s fists, etc. This 
kind of imagining does not involve the qualitative 
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feel of P1. In contrast, when one does imagine the 
qualitative feel of P1, one engages in an imagining 
from the inside. But, notes Radden, though imag-
ining the qualitative feel of P1 is sufficient for an 
imagining of P1 to be from the inside, it is not 
necessary for the imagining to be of this sort. For 
example, suppose that one imagines P1 not by vis-
ualizing oneself with a grimace and clenched fists 
but rather by imagining the qualitative feel of the 
grimace and the clenched first. This imagining is a 
way of imagining P1, and it is from the inside, but 
it still doesn’t involve the qualitative feel of P1.  
It’s only when we target that qualitative feel 
that we are engaged in the kind of imagining that 
Radden is interested in – a kind of imagining that 
she calls imagining simpliciter. It is this kind of 
imagining pain that Radden characterizes as a 
forme fruste. With this understanding in place, go-
ing forward, I’m going to drop the “simpliciter” 
qualifier – when I talk of imagining pain, I’ll mean 
imagining pain simpliciter.  
We are now in a position to look more closely 
at how Radden motivates the forme fruste charac-
terization. In her view, when we think closely 
about our efforts to imagine pain we find a strik-
ing lack of success; such lack of success, she con-
cludes, suggests that this type of imagining cannot 
be done. Central to her argument is the following 
example, what I will call the knife case: 
 
Imagine what must be a painful experience – 
catching a flying knife. Our minds seize on this 
visual image, complete with flash of metal 
moving through the air, a sense of bodily lurch-
ing forward, the facial feel of (actual) wince 
and grimace as the imagined knife makes con-
tact, the image of its searing our outstretched 
hand, and the line of blood. All of these com-
bine in an unbearable, even painful apprehen-
sion. Do we also imagine the feeling of the pain 
itself? It seems not. An irreducible element of 
pain experience, a sort of simulacra of the felt 
pain itself, is absent from this otherwise vivid, 
complex, and unpleasant imagining. Short of 





In thinking about this case, I want to start by 
noting something about Radden’s presentation of 
it. Importantly, the question posed asks not 
whether we can but whether we do imagine the 
feeling of pain. In fact, as the case is presented, the 
reader is not even invited to try to engage in an 
imagining of pain. It should be obvious that there 
might be all sorts of reasons that a reader doesn’t 
imagine pain when presented with the knife case, 
even if this were something that they could do. 
People are generally pain averse, and this pain 
aversion might well carry over into imagining. Just 
as people shy away from painful stimuli in actual 
situations, and do what they can to avoid feeling 
pain, people might also do what they can to avoid 
imagining pain. In some cases, this avoidance might 
be deliberate, even subversive. When asked to im-
agine the scenario presented, a clever person might 
deliberately disrupt the intended instruction by im-
agining that they catch the knife by the handle.
3
 But 
even absent this kind of subversive cleverness, one 
might simply take the path of least resistance. Why 
imagine the pain itself if one can imagine what one 
is being asked to imagine without it? 
Insofar as my point here seems to be only a 
concern about presentation, it might seem easily 
dismissed. Couldn’t Radden just have presented 
the knife case in a different way? But, though the 
case itself could obviously be recast to account for 
the concern I just raised, I think the point about 
presentation reveals a deeper concern. As a gen-
eral matter in philosophical discussion, one has to 
guard against sliding from “don’t”-claims to 
“can’t”-claims, and this slide seems to be a particu-
lar threat in treatments of imagination. Even 
worse, this slide seems often to go along with a 
more pernicious one, namely, the slide from “I 
can’t”-claims to “It can’t be done”-claims. 
Warning us against making this latter slide has 
been something of a pre-occupation of mine in re-
cent work, and I’ve issued this kind of warning 
about a variety of different imaginative contexts. 
To give just one example, I think we see it many 
discussions relating to transformative experience. 
As defined by L.A. Paul,
4
 an experience is trans-
formative when it brings about particularly dra-
matic changes of both an epistemic and a personal 
sort – as when one becomes a parent for this first 
time. On Paul’s view, when you have a transform-
ative experience, you learn something that is in 
principle epistemically inaccessible to you absent 
that experience. You also undergo personal chang-
es to such a great degree that even your core per-
sonal preferences are affected. Moreover, these 
changes cannot be fully understood or predicted in 
advance. In claiming that we cannot know what it 
is like to undergo a transformative experience in 
advance of undergoing it, Paul explicitly denies 
that imagination can help us to achieve such 
knowledge. On her view, someone who is not a 
parent cannot imagine what being a parent is like. 
While many people, parents and non-parents 
alike, find this claim plausible, not everyone does. 
Interestingly, in a variety of conversations I’ve had 
about this topic, some people claim to have en-
gaged in exactly this kind of imagining – and to 
have done so successfully – in advance of becom-
ing a parent. The moral? The fact that some peo-
ple can’t do it doesn’t show that no one can. Some 
people are simply better imaginers than others. 
And even for those people who claim that they 
can’t do it, one might have some reason for suspi-




ple. How hard did they try to imagine this, for ex-
ample? How long did they work at? What steps 




I suspect that a similar dynamic might well be 
in play with respect to Radden’s discussion about 
imagining pain. When I first read Radden’s knife 
case, and I got to the question “Do we also imag-
ine the feeling of the pain itself?”, my own answer 
was yes. I do, or at least I think I do, and I see no 
special reason to think my judgment about my 
own imaginative practices or capabilities would be 
faulty. Moreover, it seems that I’m not alone in 
thinking that this is something I can do. Though I 
can’t claim to have conducted any kind of rigorous 
study of this, after first reading Radden’s paper I 
have asked a lot of people whether they can imag-
ine pain, and many (indeed, the majority of people 
I’ve asked) say that they can.
6
 
But perhaps more persuasive than my own un-
scientific inquiries is the existence of empirical ev-
idence in support of the claim that pain can be im-
agined.
7
 In a 2007 study, researchers showed test 
subjects a series of images depicting painful situa-
tions and then asked the subjects to imagine the 
pain they would feel if they were in that situation. 
The study’s goal was to identify the neural activity 
associated with pain imagination; using functional 
magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI), the re-
searchers found that «the imagination of pain is 
associated with increased activity in several brain 
regions involved in the pain-related neural net-
work».
8
 For our purposes it’s important to note 
that all ten subjects in the study reported being able 
to carry out the imaginative tasks they were as-
signed, that is, they all reported being able to imag-
ine pain.
9
 Moreover, the instructions were clear in 
asking subjects to target the feeling of the pain: 
 
During the pain condition, the subjects were 
instructed specifically to feel their own pain as 
if they were in the same painful situation simi-
lar to the images presented showing painful 
events. That is, the subjects were instructed to 
imagine their own sharp acute pain as if it were 
their own arm while viewing images showing 




To be clear, in suggesting that some people 
(myself included) can imagine pain, I am by no 
means dismissing Radden’s own report that she 
can’t imagine pain, nor the reports of the individ-
uals who I queried who also claimed not to be able 
to imagine pain. Rather, it strikes me as quite like-
ly that there’s some individual difference here. But 
that said, it also strikes me as quite likely that at 
least some of this individual difference might be 
something that could be overcome. In accord with 
a line of argument I’ve been pursuing in recent 
work, imagining is a skill.
11
 As I mentioned when 
discussing how we might counter Paul’s argument 
about transformative experience, some people are 
better at it than others. And just as we can im-
prove other skills by way of practice, we can also 
get better at imagining by way of practice.
12
 
That’s not to say that this is easy. And there are 
reasons to think that imaginative practice might be 
particularly challenging when it comes to imagining 
pain. To engage in imaginative practice, we need 
some kind of prompt to get our imagination going. 
But in trying to come up with these kind of 
prompts with respect to imagining pain, we are 
likely to hit something of an obstacle. Our vocabu-
lary surrounding pain is fairly limited, and many of 
us are not very good at describing it to one another. 
It’s hard to go much beyond “sharp” or “dull” or 
“throbbing.” Thus, it’s hard to call up the right 
kinds of descriptions to serve as the necessary imag-
inative prompts. That may well be one reason that 
researchers conducting the fMRI study mentioned 
above used pictures of painful situations rather 
than descriptions of them. Noting this, however, 
suggests a possible way around the obstacle: per-
haps one could put these sorts of pictures into ser-
vice as the needed imaginative prompts.
13
 
Returning more specifically to the knife case, 
another reason that people may find it difficult to 
imagine the pain of catching a flying knife is that 
they have never experienced pain of that sort. 
What we can imagine, and how easily we can im-
agine it, depends not only on our skill as imaginers 
but also on the stock of past experiences that we 
have to draw on. So, yes, maybe someone has 
nicked themselves with a knife while chopping 
vegetables, but the pain that results from that kind 
of kitchen accident is quite different in intensity 
from the pain that results from an accelerating 
blade that you catch in your palm. If this is right, 
then again, the imaginative failure would be a con-
tingent matter rather than a matter of principle. 
Here, however, there seems a natural rejoinder. 
Even if we have exactly the right stock of experi-
ences, even if we have previously experienced a 
pain of the exact sort that we are now trying to 
imagine, some still report the imagining to be out 
of reach. Many women who have experienced 
childbirth and the pain of parturition claim not 
even to be able to remember that pain – let alone 
to imagine it.
14
 This memory failure is not con-
fined to parturition, as many people claim to be 
unable to remember the feeling of past pains more 
generally. Ultimately, however, I don’t think that 
this rejoinder succeeds. That’s not to say that I 
want to dismiss these reports. Just as I accept 
Radden’s claim about her own inability to imagine 
the pain in the knife case, I likewise accept the 
claims of people about their inability to remember 
past pain. But when we talk to people about re-
membering pain, it turns out that there’s a similar 
dialectic to that found when we talk to people 
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about imagining pains, i.e., in addition to the peo-
ple who claim to be unable to remember their past 
pain, we also find people who claim to be perfectly 
able to engage in these kinds of imaginative acts. 
Empirical investigation into this issue reflects this 
disagreement, with some studies suggesting that 
most people cannot remember pain and other 
studies suggesting the reverse.
15
 While some take 
these studies to be contradictory or puzzling, the 
line I’m offering here suggests that a different di-
agnosis is available, namely, that there are vast in-
dividual differences with respect to pain memory 
just as there are vast individual differences with 
respect to pain imagination. 
 
█  3 The loose vs. strict response 
 
If my argument in the previous section is right, 
then Radden’s characterization of imagining pain 
as a forme fruste is mistaken. But here I envision 
that there’s an obvious line of response, what I’ll 
call the loose vs. strict response. One might grant 
that some people can do something that in some 
sense counts as imagining pain, but in doing so, 
they don’t imagine the pain exactly as it would feel 
were they to experience it. Rather it’s only a rough 
approximation. And this is something that Radden 
might be able to accept, since imagining a rough 
approximation of a painful sensation P1 is plausibly 
different from imagining P1 itself. Here’s one way 
to put the point: talk of imagining pain, even when 
we’re focused on imagining pain simpliciter, can be 
understood in a loose sense and a strict sense. If my 
argument only establishes that we can imagine pain 
in the loose sense, and what Radden is concerned to 
deny is that one cannot imagine pain in the strict 
sense, then she can grant everything I’ve said with-
out giving up her conclusion. 
It’s an interesting question whether Radden 
can accept that people can imagine pain even in 
the loose sense, i.e., whether doing so is consistent 
with the overall line of argument that she wants to 
make against the skeptic about the impossibility 
of delusional affection when it comes to depres-
sion. But let’s set that question aside; as noted ear-
lier, I do not aim in this commentary to weigh in 
on her debate against the skeptic. Instead, I’d like 
to explore in more detail the distinction between 
the loose and strict sense of imagining pain. 
Should we accept this distinction? If so, should we 
also accept that we can’t imagine pain in the strict 
sense? And again, if so, does that mean that my 
criticism of Radden’s argument fails? 
I don’t see much promise in trying to deny the 
coherence of the distinction proposed. One might 
quibble about whether the distinction deserves to 
be characterized in the language of loose vs. strict, 
but certainly one can do a better or worse job at 
imagining something, and certainly imaginings 
might differ in the degree to which they accurately 
correctly capture their target. This becomes espe-
cially easy to see when we consider the distinction 
between realistic vs. fantastical imaginings. For 
the purpose of this discussion, we’ve been focused 
on realistic imaginings, imaginings which aim at 
accurate representation of their target. But some-
times our imaginings have a different aim. I might 
imagine my messy desk in a tidier state, or my 
white office walls painted in a nice shade of taupe, 
or my unfinished manuscript in a state of comple-
tion. I might even imagine the desk magically tidy-
ing itself, the walls magically painting themselves, 
and the manuscript magically finishing itself. (The 
last is an especially satisfying imagining.) When 
compared to the corresponding cases in which I 
imagine the desk, the walls, and the manuscript as 
they actually are, these fantastical imaginings 
clearly differ in the degree to which they accurate-
ly capture their target. 
So the distinction should be accepted. But how 
exactly does this distinction help Radden? Why 
would imagining pain be a forme fruste if our pain 
imaginings are only imaginings of pain in the loose 
sense? It strikes me that we have good reason to de-
ny that it would. First, though all of the more fantas-
tical imaginings fail to accurately represent what 
they’re aiming to represent – the desk, the walls, the 
manuscript – they are nonetheless still imaginings of 
those very things. My imagining of the tidy desk, even 
though it does not accurately represent the desk as it 
actually is, is still an imagining of the desk, and the 
same holds for my imagining of the differently 
painted walls or the completed manuscript. Likewise, 
then, imagining of a painful state P1 can still be an 
imagining of P1 even if it does not fully or accurately 
represent the pain as it actually is. 
Of course, there will be some limitations on 
how dramatically an imagining can depart from 
the actuality of a thing and still count as an imag-
ining of that very thing. Articulating these limita-
tions is likely to be an incredibly daunting task, 
but no matter how the precise details get spelled 
out, my imagining presumably doesn’t count as an 
imagining of the desk if what I imagine looks like 
a frog, and likewise, my imagining of P1 presuma-
bly doesn’t count as imagining of this painful state 
if what I imagine feels like a light and pleasant 
tickle. That said, it also seems clear that no matter 
how the precise details of these limitations get 
spelled out, we can still accept that an imagining 
of a given target does not need to be wholly and 
fully accurate in order to count as an imagining of 
that target. Thus, even if we are only able to imag-
ine pain in the loose sense, our imagining still 
counts as an imagining of the pain. 
But let’s suppose that Radden digs in her heels 
and insists that even if imagining pain can be done 
in the loose sense, imagining pain will still be a 
forme fruste unless pain can be imagined in the 




imagined as it actually feels, that it can’t be imag-
ined wholly and perfectly accurately, then her ar-
gument goes through. It’s not clear to me that we 
should grant this – rather, it seems at best to me 
an open question – but for the sake of this discus-
sion, suppose that we do. In this case, a further 
question arises: Why is whole and perfect accuracy 
required even for imagining in the strict sense? To 
my mind, this is not a reasonable standard even 
when we’re talking about the strict sense of imagin-
ing. Consider visual imaginings. I think we often 
take visual imaginings that are not wholly and per-
fectly accurate – that are lacking certain details – to 
still be imaginings in the strict sense. When I imag-
ine my spouse’s face, does my imagining have to 
contain each miniscule wrinkle, each freckle, in or-
der for me to count as having really imagined his 
face, that is, as having imagined it in the strict 
sense? This doesn’t seem to me how we really think 
of imaginings in general, and I see no reason why 
imagining pain would be any exception. Unless 
we’re going to deny that imagining can ever be 
done in the strict sense, no matter the context or 
modality, it turns out that even if we grant that our 
pain imagining cannot be wholly and perfectly ac-
curate this would not in and of itself mean that im-
agining pain can never be done in the strict sense.  
Ultimately, then, I don’t think that the loose vs. 
strict response succeeds. There seems no question 
that we can at least imagine pain in a loose sense, 
and such an imagining will still count as an imagin-
ing of pain. But I think we also should accept that 
we can imagine pain in the strict sense. Denying 
this claim commits one to an impossibly restrictive 
conception of successful imagining, one that we do 
not (and should not) typically accept when it comes 
to other kinds of imaginative activities. 
 
█  4 Concluding remarks 
 
Before closing this commentary, it’s worth con-
sidering one last line of objection to my attempt to 
reject Radden’s argument. Suppose I’ve been suc-
cessful in showing that we really can imagine pain, 
perhaps even in the strict sense. In cases where we 
do so, however, what we’ve essentially done is to 
have brought ourselves into a state in which we 
relive the pain (or, if it’s a kind of pain that’s never 
before been experienced, that we live it – but for 
simplicity’s sake, let’s talk just about reliving pain). 
Since reliving an experience is different from im-
agining it (think about flashbacks, for example), 
this kind of mental activity would not provide us 
with a case where we’re imagining pain. Rather, 
what’s going is an actual pain experience. Thus, 
one might think that Radden must be right that 
imagining pain is a forme fruste. Ironically, coming 
to meet the conditions for success in the relevant 
imaginative exercise guarantees failure. 
To my mind, this objection too must be reject-
ed. Perhaps it would be reasonable to say that this 
is not a case of merely imagining, as Radden some-
times puts it, since it is a case of imagining plus 
experiencing. But an act that is not merely an im-
agining can still be imagining – in fact, it seems 
that it should be so as a matter of definition. 
Something that is not merely a criticism is still a 
criticism, and something that is not merely a com-
pliment is still a compliment. 
For the sake of Radden’s argument with the 
skeptic, the difference between acts that are mere-
ly imaginings and acts that are not plays a key role. 
If she can show that imagining pain is not an act 
of mere imagining, then she may well have what 
she needs to make her anti-skeptical case. But 
showing that something is not merely an imagin-
ing does not show that it is not an imagining, and 
so, for the purposes of the debate that I’ve been 
interested in here – a debate about whether the 
feeling of pain is imaginable – Radden needs to 
show something more. And that, I contend, is pre-
cisely what she has not done. 
 
█  Notes 
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 That said, this issue will re-arise briefly in section 4. 
2
 J. RADDEN, Imagined and delusional pain, p. 154. 
3
 The deliberate avoidance need not be the result of this 
kind of game-playing. Suppose, for example, that Rad-
den’s question were asked of an accomplished knife 
juggler. A knife juggler is accustomed to catching 
knives by the handle, so when they fail to construe this 
act as one that would involve a painful experience and 
hence don’t imagine pain, this need not be subversive 
or even deliberate but rather simply what comes most 
naturally to their mind. 
4
 Cf. L.A. PAUL, Transformative experiences. 
5
 I discuss the role of imagination in the context of 
transformative experience in A. KIND, What imagina-
tion teaches. Another place I think we might see a simi-
lar slide from “I don’t” to “I can’t” to “It can’t be done” 
is in the context of imagining across experiential di-
vides. I discuss this in A. KIND, Bridging the divide: Im-
agining across experiential perspectives. 
6
 As noted earlier, I am here (and throughout) dropping 
the simpliciter modifier, but I want to be clear that the 
people I’ve talked to who claim to be able to imagine pain 
are talking about imagining the qualitative feeling of pain. 
7
 It’s also worth noting that philosophers Frederique de 
Vignemont and Pierre Jacob commit themselves to the 
possibility of imagining the feeling of pain in their interest-
ing discussion of empathic and vicarious pain (cf. F. DE 
VIGNEMONT, P. JACOB, What is it like to feel another’s 
pain?, pp. 297-298). 
8
 Y. OGINI, H. NEMOTO, K. INUI, S. SAITO, R. KAKIGI, F. 
GOTO, Inner experience of pain: Imagination of pain while 
viewing images showing painful events forms subjective pain 
representation in human brain, here p. 1139. 
9
 Cf. ibid., p. 1141.  
10
 Ibid., p. 1140. 
11
 Cf. A. KIND, The skill of imagination. 
12
 Cf. A. KIND, Learning to imagine; A. KIND, Fiction 
and the cultivation of imagination. 
 





 Matters are probably even more challenging when it 
comes to the particular kind of pain that Radden is in-
terested in, the pain of depression, which many find 
hard to describe and where it’s harder to see how pic-
tures could be used. But that doesn’t mean we’re at a 
complete loss. For example, we might turn to the ac-
counts of gifted writers such as William Styron, who 
paints a particularly clear picture of the pain of his de-
pression in his memoir, Darkness visible, and aim to im-
agine what’s being described. 
14
 For an interesting discussion, cf. B.G. MONTERO, What 
experience doesn’t teach: Pain amnesia and a new para-
digm for memory research. 
15
 This research is summarized nicely in B.G. MONTE-
RO, What experience doesn’t teach. Her own assessment 
of what we should make of this disagreement is quite 
different from mine. 
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